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SPREADING DEMOCRACY EVERYWHERE
BUT HERE: THE UNLIKELY PROSPECT OF
FOREIGN NATIONAL DEFENDANTS
ASSERTING TREATY VIOLATIONS IN
AMERICAN COURTS AFTER SANCHEZLLAMAS v. OREGON AND MEDELLIN v.
DRETKE
MIRIAM F. MIQUELON WEISMANN*

Neither can international institutional issues be treated
as if they were exotic hot house flowers, rarely of
relevance to domestic courts. Those issues, when
relevant, must be briefed fully with the legal
relationships between our Court, and say the
International Court of Justice, comprehensively
explained.**
- Justice Stephen Breyer
I.

INTRODUCTION

T

hree recent Supreme Court decisions underscore the
continuing decisional confusion regarding the binding legal
effect of international law in domestic state courts. In
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, Bustillo v. Johnson (companion
case), and Medellin v Dretke, 1 the United States Supreme

* Associate Professor, Business and Law, Suffolk University, Sawyer
Business School, formerly Associate Professor, Southern New England
School of Law and Director, Roundtable Symposium Law Journal. Coauthor CYBERCRIME: THE INVESTIGATION, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF
A COMPUTER-RELATED CRIME (Carolina Press, 2d ed.) (2006) and The
Convention on Cybercrime:
A Harmonizing Implementation of
International Penal Law: What Prospects for Procedural Due Process?
23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 329 (2005).
** Remarks of Associate Justice Stephen Breyer, The American
Society of International Law, 97th Annual Meeting (April 4, 2003).
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Court sidestepped two legal questions: whether a defendant
who is a foreign national may raise a claim, at trial or on
appeal, that state officials violated the defendant’s Article 36
rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations2
(VCCR); and, whether orders entered against the United
States, pursuant to the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice 3 (ICJ), are binding on domestic
state courts. Instead of deciding these questions, the Supreme
Court merely concluded that even “assuming” the existence
of an individual right to assert a treaty claim, American
courts can apply state procedural default rules to bar any
remedy for the violation. 4 Further, the Court addressed only
the binding effect of ICJ treaty interpretation on domestic
courts, sidestepping the larger issue of the binding effect on
domestic courts of ICJ orders, entered against the United
States as a treaty member, under the ICJ’s compulsory
jurisdiction. At the heart of the treaty dispute is the habitual
domestic noncompliance with Article 36 of the VCCR, which
requires state and federal law enforcement authorities to
promptly advise a detained foreign national of his right to
1

Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669 (2006); Bustillo v.
Johnson, No. 05-51 (companion case); and Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S.
660 (2005), on remand Ex Parte Medellin, No. AP-75207, 2006 W.L.
3302639 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2006), petition for cert. filed, 75
U.S.L.W. 3398 (January 16, 2007) (No. 06-984).
2
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, April 24, 1963, 21
U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (1969) [hereinafter “VCCR”].
3
The International Court of Justice is a multinational body, operating
in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, that interprets and
applies international law in cases within the ICJs jurisdiction. Under the
Charter of the United Nations, “[a]ll Members of the United Nations are
ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice.”
Charter of the United Nations, Art. 93, 59 Stat. 1031, 1051, U.N.T.S. No.
993. The United States Senate consented to the Charter of the United
Nations on July 28, 1945, 91 Cong. Rec. 8185, 8190, causing the United
States to be a party to the Statute of the ICJ.
4
In the Sanchez-Llamas and Bustillo decisions, the Court “assumed
without deciding” that Article 36 invested individuals with enforceable
rights in American courts finding it “unnecessary to resolve the question”
because petitioners were not entitled to relief on their claims. SanchezLlamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2677-78.
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contact his consulate.5 International law recognizes that
severing communications between a detained foreign national
and his consulate may serve as an unlawful coercive measure
used by law enforcement to extract confessions or obtain
other incriminating evidence from an otherwise uninformed
and legally disadvantaged suspect.6
Seemingly, these three cases merely join a long list of
unresolved predecessor criminal cases raising the same
arguments in the context of the same treaty violation.
However, there is one significant difference between these
three cases and the cases that precede them. Prior to the
Supreme Court’s decisions in the individual cases of these
three defendants, the ICJ entered an order against the United
States, under its compulsory jurisdiction acceded to by the
United States, adjudicating the rights of the same defendants.
Specifically, the ICJ found that state authorities violated the
Article 36 treaty rights of convicted foreign national
5

At least one scholar previously recognized the need for informing
the legal issues in terms of the political consequences and made various
recommendations in the hope of avoiding the inevitable collision between
the United States and the International Court of Justice. See William
Aceves, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Study of
Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 257 (1998).
The true consequences of the political fallout could not have been
anticipated until after the 2001 and 2004 ICJ opinions finally deciding the
very legal issues avoided by the Supreme Court in Sanchez-Llamas,
Bustillo, and Medellin, respectively. Even the Supreme Court recognized
that a final ICJ adjudication on the issues changed the legal playing field,
distinguishing cases prior to the final adjudication by the ICJ. See
Medellin, 544 U.S. at 665, n. 3.
6
See Brief of Ambassador L. Bruce Laingen et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669 (2005)
(Nos. 04-10566, 05-51) citing the U.S. Department of State Foreign
Affairs Manual (1984), 7 FAM 411-14:
Apart from ensuring the timely provision of legal
information, prompt notification and access ‘is necessary to
forestall physical abuse of the prisoner … or to ascertain when
such abuse has occurred.’ American consuls are required to
determine if there has been ‘any physical abuse or violation of
rights’ and to look for signs of ill-treatment, bearing in mind
that ‘many forms of physical abuse, including systematic
torture, are calculated to leave no physical evidence.’ Id.
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defendants in fifty-one capital cases, including the cases of
Sanchez-Llamas, Bustillo and Medellin, and that all fifty-one
defendants had the individual right to raise Article 36
violations in their respective domestic criminal cases. The
ICJ further ordered the United States to review the
convictions and sentences of all fifty-one defendants and
remediate the treaty violations in accordance with America’s
international legal obligations under the VCCR. The ICJ
particularly warned the United States against applying
domestic procedural default rules to bar remediation. Thus,
the ICJ guaranteed a detained foreign national defendant the
legal right to raise this treaty violation in domestic criminal
proceedings in the United States where the Supreme Court
has yet to do so and in direct conflict with lower domestic
court decisions.7
In fact, the growing tension between the Supreme Court’s
concern over federalist principles honoring the states’
autonomous rights to conduct criminal trials without undue
federal interference and the binding effect of ICJ decisions in
cases over which the ICJ clearly exercised compulsory
jurisdiction, is palpable.8 Indeed, the Sanchez-Llamas,
Bustillo and Medellin cases confronted the Supreme Court
with the same legal issues that the ICJ had already resolved in
cases where the United States was a member-party.9 Still, the
Supreme Court chose to ignore ICJ orders and treaty
interpretation in reaching its decisions.10 The reasons seem
7

Historically, those state courts that have previously considered this
legal question decided, contrary to ICJ precedent, either that an Article 36
violation does not create an individual right that a defendant may assert in
a state criminal case, or assumed that if such a right existed, procedural
default rules barred any remedy. Thus, state courts have held that there is
no right and if there is, then there is no remedy. See, e.g., Rocha v. State,
16 S.W.3d 1, 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
8
See Medellin, 544 U.S. at 683-84, (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
9
LaGrand Case (F.R.G. V. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27) and Case
Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004
I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31).
10
In fact, the ICJ’s legal precedents were fully briefed and presented
to the Court as central to the appellants’ argument. Brief of International
Court of Justice Experts as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, SanchezLlamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669 (2005) (Nos. 04-10566, 05-51).
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obvious. Arguably, any ruling in conformity with ICJ
precedent would legally bind American courts, and to some
extent American foreign policy, to the ICJ’s treaty
interpretation.11 Additionally, any ruling in favor of ICJ
precedent would expressly contradict prior federal and state
court decisions. Lastly, providing finality to the question
would also force the Supreme Court into the seldom traveled
arena of international law, a venue of unusual discomfort for
the current Supreme Court.12
Instead, the Supreme Court remanded the Medellin case
to allow the Texas state court to consider the issues that it
refused to decide. Not surprisingly, the Texas court merely
shunned both the ICJ orders and the President’s commitment
to the ICJ, binding state courts to follow these international
orders.13 This led to a second ascent, in 2007, of the Medellin
case to the Supreme Court’s doorstep.14 To add to the
confusion, while the Medellin case was pending before the
Texas court on remand, the Supreme Court ruled in SanchezLlamas and Bustillo, deciding at least one of the issues it had
earlier remanded for decision in Medellin. Parenthetically,
that ruling expressly contradicted the ICJ’s earlier order.
11

And so the United States has argued at length in the Medellin
decision. Medellin, 544 U.S. at 693-94.
12
The court’s decision in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005),
underscored the heated dispute between the justices about the role of
international law in resolving domestic legal disputes. Indeed, Justice
Breyer disagreed with his colleagues on the court who believe that
comparative analysis of international and domestic law “is inappropriate
to the task of interpreting the constitution, though it was of course quite
relevant to the task of writing one.” Justice Breyer directly addresses the
authority of the ICJ: “Neither can international institutional issues be
treated as if they were exotic hot house flowers, rarely of relevance to
domestic courts. Those issues, when relevant, must be briefed fully with
the legal relationships between our Court, and say the International Court
of Justice, comprehensively explained.” Remarks of Associate Justice
Stephen Breyer, The American Society of International Law, 97th Annual
Meeting (April 4, 2003), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
publicinfo/speeches/sp_04-04-03.html (last visited April 27, 2007).
13
Ex Parte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d 315, (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
14
Ex Parte Medellin, petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3398
(January 16, 2007) (No. 06-984).
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The political pressure undoubtedly felt by the Supreme
Court following the contentious foreign policy dispute that
erupted between the United States and the ICJ as a result of
the unfavorable ICJ decisions, may account for the Court’s
reluctance to finally decide these thorny questions of
international law. While ICJ orders are technically binding
only on the member-parties in the case before it,15 the
language of the ICJ orders establishes clear international legal
policy based on treaty interpretation certain to be invoked in
future cases where the ICJ retains compulsory jurisdiction.
The political knee-jerk reaction of the United States, in
response to the unfavorable orders, was an unceremonious
withdrawal in 2005 from the international protocol vesting
compulsory jurisdiction in the ICJ to decide these issues.16
The presidential caveat was a parting Memorandum
committing American courts to abide only by the current ICJ
orders.17 Those ICJ orders were then ignored by the Supreme
Court in the three individual decisions, which served only to
further intensify the debate in the state courts.
To squarely address this decisional quagmire, this article
examines the binding effect of ICJ orders, entered pursuant to
its compulsory jurisdiction, on American courts; earlier
decisions of the Supreme Court penalizing foreign nationals
for failing to timely raise individual treaty claims; the effect
on treaty enforcement in domestic courts after the executive
branch’s recent foreign policy decision to withdraw from
compulsory ICJ jurisdiction; the current policy disputes
dividing the United States and the ICJ; and, the national
interest, or lack thereof, in treaty compliance.
This article concludes that the government’s current claim
that a “long standing presumption” exists to prevent the
assertion of individual rights under Article 36 is simply not
15

Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 59, (June 26,
1945), 59 Stat. 1062, 33 U.N.T.S. No 993 [hereinafter “Court’s Statute”].
16
See discussion infra Section III. A. (discussing the withdrawal of
the United States from the Protocol).
17
President Bush, Memorandum for the Attorney General (Feb. 28,
2005), App. To Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Medellin v.
Dretke, O.T. 2004, No. 04-5928, p. 9a. [hereinafter “Memorandum”].
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supported by international law or prior decisions of the
Supreme Court. It appears to be nothing more than a
disingenuous effort to ground foreign policy and politics in
decisional law. However, even if the right exists, the recent
exercise by the executive branch of its foreign policy
prerogative in treaty negotiations may effectively prevent the
judicial branch from deciding the remedial issue on other
than a case by case basis. Indeed, those Supreme Court
Justices favoring recognition of an individual right to assert
an Article 36 treaty violation remain curiously tight-lipped
over the remedy. In short, the political score between
America and the ICJ will have to be settled before the
Supreme Court is free to decide the issues which,
parenthetically, have already been decided by the ICJ. In any
case, the Supreme Court needs to get back into the game.
Justice Breyer’s observation about the need to integrate U.S.
decisional law with the decisions of the ICJ, where
appropriate, makes legal sense.18
Finally, this article advocates that, as a matter of policy,
there is a national interest in creating individually enforceable
rights and domestic remedies to redress demonstrable treaty
violations, particularly where American citizens may be
subject to the same or similar treatment in foreign courts.
Following the “Golden Rule” in American foreign policy and
decisional law may provide predictable and consistent
enforcement of individual treaty rights in American courts in
the hope of securing the same fair treatment for American
citizens abroad.

18

In fact, it has become a legal necessity. On the subsequent remand
of the Medellin case from the Supreme Court, the Texas Supreme Court
refused to honor both the ICJ order and the presidential memorandum
committing the states to comply with the ICJ order based on the principle
of comity. It is against this backdrop that the Supreme Court is now being
asked to decide the issues on the second petition for writ of certiorari filed
by Medellin, Ex Parte Medellin, supra note 14.
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FRAMING THE LEGAL ISSUES
A. Medellin v. Dretke

Medellin, a Mexican national, confessed to participating
in a capital offense that resulted in his conviction and the
imposition of a death sentence.19 His conviction was affirmed
on appeal. Subsequently, Medellin filed a state habeas corpus
action raising for the first time the denial under Article 36 of
his right to consular access under the VCCR. After
exhausting state remedies, Medellin filed a similar habeas
petition in the federal courts raising the same issue. While it
was pending, the ICJ determined20 that the VCCR guaranteed
individually enforceable rights in domestic proceedings and
that the United States violated those rights. The ICJ further
ordered the United States, in Medellin’s case and fifty others,
to review the convictions and sentences without allowing
state procedural default rules to bar such review.21
Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged but ignored
the ICJ decision22 in Medellin and instead, ruled in
conformity with an earlier Supreme Court decision in Breard
v. Greene 23 where state procedural default rules were applied
to bar review and other prior Fifth Circuit decisions rejecting
any individual rights to raise a treaty violation.24 After the
Supreme Court granted certiorari, President George W. Bush
issued a memorandum committing domestic courts to follow
the ICJ order in the fifty-one cases “in accordance with
general principles of comity.”25 The Supreme Court,
thereafter, granted certiorari to consider two questions in the
Medellin case: first, whether a federal court is bound by the
ICJ order ruling that domestic courts must review Medellin’s
19

Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 662 (2005).
Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v.
U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, No.128 (Mar. 31).
21
Medellin, 544 U.S. at 662-63.
22
Id. at 663.
23
Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (per curiam).
24
See, e.g., United States v. Jiminez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 195 (5th
Cir. 2001).
25
Memorandum, supra note 17.
20
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conviction under the VCCR without regard to procedural
default rules; and second, whether a federal court should give
legal effect, as a matter of judicial comity and uniform treaty
interpretation, to the ICJ’s order.26 Instead of deciding these
issues, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Texas
court to rule in light of the ICJ order and the President’s
Memorandum.27 However, the Court indulges in several
pages of dicta commenting on the merits of the legal issues
which “are not free from doubt”28 and even suggesting an
avenue for a later appeal of the case “unencumbered by the
issues that arise from the procedural posture of this action.”29
The Court also cautioned that its decision in Breard was
decided at a time when “we confronted no final ICJ
adjudication.”30
As discussed in further detail below,31 the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and ruled32 that the
ICJ order was not binding federal law and thus, under Breard,
did not preempt state procedural default rules barring
review33 and that the President of the United States had
exceeded his constitutional authority in binding domestic
courts to ICJ orders.34 In response to this decision, Medellin
filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court in 2007.35
To further complicate matters, the Supreme Court ruled
on several of the same issues in Sanchez-Lamas v. Oregon
and Bustillo v. Johnson, while the Medellin case was on
remand before the Texas Court of Appeals.36
26

Medellin, 544 U.S. at 661-62.
Id. at 666-67.
28
Id. at 664.
29
Id. at 664, n.1.
30
Id. at 665, n.3.
31
See infra Section VI.D.
32
Ex Parte Medellin, No. AP-75207, 2006 W.L. 3302639 (Tex.
Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2006).
33
Id. at 7-8.
34
Id. at 19.
35
Ex Parte Medellin, petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3398
(January 16, 2007) (No. 06-984).
36
Ex Parte Medellin, supra note 13.
27
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B. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, and Bustillo v.
Johnson (companion case)
Sanchez-Llamas and Bustillo were consolidated to decide
three issues: first, whether Article 36 of the VCCR grants
rights enforceable by individuals in domestic proceedings;
second, whether an Article 36 claim can be barred by a state
procedural default rule; and third, whether suppression of
evidence is an appropriate remedy for an Article 36 violation.
The Supreme Court “assumed without deciding” that even if
the VCCR created judicially enforceable rights, 37
suppression of evidence was not an appropriate remedy for an
Article 36 violation and that state procedural default rules
barred relief.38 Significantly, the Court failed to decide
whether ICJ orders, entered pursuant to its compulsory
jurisdiction acceded to by the United States, were binding on
domestic courts. Instead, it ruled that the VCCR did not
expressly require suppression of evidence as a remedial
measure and because the exclusionary rule was entirely an
“American legal creation,” it had no application to the cases
before the Court.39 While the Court acknowledged that
domestic courts must apply the remedy afforded in a selfexecuting treaty in the course of adjudicating litigants rights,
it cautioned that, “where a treaty does not provide a particular
remedy, either expressly or implicitly, it is not for federal
courts to impose one on the states through lawmaking of their
own.”40
The Court applied the same logic to the procedural
default question. Because the treaty allows the United States
to implement ICJ orders “in conformity with the laws of the
receiving states,” the state procedural default rules apply.41
That reasoning, however, begs the central question of
whether the ICJ orders are entitled to binding effect where
37

Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669, 2677 (2006)
Id. at 2674.
39
Id. at 2678.
40
Id. at 2680.
41
Id. at 2678.
38
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state procedural default rules deny “full effect” to the
implementation of a self-executing treaty. That inherent
clash of wills between the VCCR as a self-executing treaty
and state procedural default rules barring relief, which rules
the ICJ found impaired the United States’ international
obligations to act in a manner that accords full effect to the
treaty, remains chiefly unaddressed by the Supreme Court.42
The political strain on the Court was apparent from the
decision: “[W]hile courts interpret treaties for themselves, the
meaning given them by the departments of government
particularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement is
given great weight.”43 However, rather than looking to the
negotiating history of the VCCR and the past legal positions
asserted by the United States in the ICJ with respect to the
subject issues being decided by the Court, the Supreme Court
chose merely to rely on the President’s 2005 memorandum
for the short-sighted proposition that if the President
authorized withdrawal from the treaty protocol and was
unwilling to commit to the binding affect of ICJ orders on
domestic courts, the Supreme Court was not in a position to
second guess that political decision.44 This analysis of the
government’s negotiating and enforcement position flies in
the face of 46 years of participation by the United States in
the VCCR and contradicts the actual legal positions asserted
by it in the ICJ with respect to Article 36 violations.45

42

When confronted with the question, the Court merely stated that
the “full effect” issue was not timely raised by the parties. Id. at 2685.
43
Id. (citing Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961)).
44
Id.
45
This was particularly true during the Iran hostage crisis in 1979.
See infra section V.
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IN A

Vol. 2
FOREIGN

A. The Rift Between the United States and the
International Court of Justice
Ironically, the United States was the first country to
herald the ICJ as the court with exclusive jurisdiction over
Article 36 violations when, in 1979, it invoked the exclusive
jurisdiction of the ICJ over an Article 36 violation against a
group of American citizens.46 As a matter of foreign policy
and treaty negotiation, the decision to select the ICJ as the
appropriate forum was in conformity with the 1969
ratification of the VCCR,47 whereupon the United States also
agreed to the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes48
[hereinafter “Protocol”]. Among other things, the Protocol is
a forum selection clause that invests the ICJ with exclusive
jurisdiction to decide treaty issues under the VCCR.49
However, in recent years, after the ICJ repeatedly declared
the United States in violation of the rights of foreign nationals
under Article 36, America’s foreign and legal policies
changed dramatically regarding the binding effect of ICJ
decisions in its domestic courts and the continuing exercise of
its compulsory jurisdiction over the United States.
Indeed, the worst foreign policy trouble began in 2001,
when the ICJ ruled that the United States violated Article 36
in a case in which Germany and the United States were
parties.50 There, the ICJ resolved the very legal issue that
currently remains unresolved by the Supreme Court, namely,
that Article 36 creates an individually enforceable treaty right
46

International Instruments, The International Justice Project,
http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/nationalsInstruments.cfm (last
visited April 27, 2007).
47
Charter of the United Nations, supra note 3.
48
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention Concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596
U.N.T.S. 487 [hereinafter “Protocol”].
49
See infra Section VII. B.
50
LaGrand Case (F.R.G. V. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27).
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in the domestic courts of a member state, and where a
defendant was not promptly advised of his Article 36 right, is
later convicted and subject to a severe sentence, the United
States “should allow review and reconsideration”51 of the
sentence. 52 Matters further escalated when in 2004, in a case
in which Mexico and the United States were parties, the ICJ
again ruled that the United States was in violation of Article
36 and ordered the United States to provide the same relief to
convicted foreign nationals.53
In direct response to the 2004 ICJ decision, the President
of the United States issued a policy memorandum in February
2005 stating that the United States would give effect to the
2004 ICJ decision54 in accordance with general principles of
comity in the individual cases then pending in American
courts.55 However, one month later, in March 2005, while
several unrelated cases raising the same Article 36 treaty
violation were pending before the United States Supreme
Court, the United States unceremoniously withdrew from the
Protocol that it had signed 46 years earlier, repudiating the
policy of compulsory ICJ jurisdiction under the VCCR and
the Protocol.56
51

Previously, the ICJ had used the term “should” in its orders
imposing remedial obligations to be followed by the United States.
However, by the time it entered its order of provisional measures in
Avena, the ICJ conspicuously changed the language of the remedial
obligations of the United States to “shall.” This may certainly be
interpreted as an attempt by the ICJ to bolster the binding effect of its
decisions on the United States. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN, et.al.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE, 138, n.3
(Foundation Press 2004).
52
LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 466
53
Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v.
U.S.), 2004 I.C.J.128 (Mar. 31).
54
Id.
55
Memorandum, supra note 17.
56
Statement by Dala Jordan, spokeswoman for the U.S. State
Department, describing the need for withdrawal to “[protect] against
future International Court of Justice judgments that might similarly
interfere in ways we did not anticipate when we joined the optional
protocol.” U.S. Says It Has Withdrawn From World Judicial Body, N.Y.
TIMES, (March 10, 2005), available at http://select.nytimes.com/search/
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To underscore the legal morass created by the foreign
policy dispute with the ICJ, the Texas state court, reviewing
the Medellin case on remand, flatly rejected the binding affect
of the President’s Memorandum of February 2005 in which
the President explicitly committed the courts of the United
States to abide by ICJ legal precedent in respect to all
pending cases affected by its decision.57 Not surprisingly, a
petition for certiorari is currently pending in the Supreme
Court in the Medellin case commencing its second ascent on
the same legal issues.58
B. The Supreme Court on the Sidelines
It was against this foreign policy backdrop in 2006 that
the Supreme Court was again confronted with a case raising
the defense of an Article 36 treaty violation in a state criminal
prosecution. Undoubtedly, the now contentious foreign policy
dispute between the United States and the ICJ complicated
the Supreme Court’s review of the same legal issue already
adjudicated in those cases where the United States had
voluntarily acceded to ICJ jurisdiction. Faced with clear
international treaty interpretation recognizing the individual
right of a foreign national to raise the defense in domestic
proceedings and the actual court orders issued by the ICJ,59
the Supreme Court simply chose to sidestep the issue.
Instead, the Court merely “assumed without deciding”60 that
the particular defendants had the right to raise the Article 36
treaty violation in their state criminal cases. Then, to avoid
any direct confrontation with the mandate of the ICJ to
review any case where a significant incarceratory sentence

restricted/article?res=FA0C16F63D580C738DDDAA0894DD404482
(last visited April 27, 2007).
57
Ex Parte Medellin, No. AP-75207, 2006 W.L. 3302639 (Tex.
Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2007).
58
Ex Parte Medellin, petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3398
(January 16, 2007) (No. 06-984).
59
See infra Section VII.C. (discussing the question of the binding
effect of ICJ decisions on American domestic courts).
60
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669, 2677-78 (2006).
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was imposed despite the violation,61 the Supreme Court
disingenuously echoed lower state court decisions rejecting
suppression as a remedy in one case62 and concluded that the
issue could not be raised belatedly on appeal in another.63 As
a result of its rulings in the Sanchez-Llamas and Bustillo
cases, the Supreme Court foreclosed the use of the
exclusionary rule as a domestic judicial remedy to vindicate
violations of Article 36 in state court proceedings.
The decisions are disconcerting because the Supreme
Court ruled on the applicability of domestic legal remedies
without first resolving the very existence or nature of the
right sought to be vindicated and with complete indifference
to international legal precedent. The Supreme Court decisions
illustrate a plain legal inconsistency between domestic law
and the international resolution of treaty issues.
IV.

AMERICA’S SUBMISSION
1945 – 1969

TO

ICJ JURISDICTION:

From the inception of the ICJ in 1945, the international
community wrought a compromise, hampering its
jurisdiction. Article 36(2) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice64 [hereinafter “Court’s Statute”] offered
member states the option to make “declarations” accepting
the ICJ’s jurisdiction, including reservations that bar the ICJ
from hearing certain classes of disputes. Exercising its
option, the United States declared that it would accede to the
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ with one reservation,
known as the Connally Reservation.65 The Connally
Reservation permits the United States to opt out of ICJ
jurisdiction over “disputes with regard to matters which are
61

Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v.
U.S.), 2004 I.C.J.128, paras. 127-32 (Mar. 31).
62
Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2677.
63
Id.
64
Court’s Statute, supra note 15.
65
See Acceptance of Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice on August 2, 1946, 92 Cong. Rec. 10, 694-697, Dep’t
St.Bull., Sept. 1946, at 452-53.
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essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United
States as determined by the United States of America.”66
In short, the United States undercut the compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ by retaining an automatic jurisdictional
veto over the ICJ in matters deemed to be within America’s
domestic jurisdiction. A surge of criticism followed the
Connally Reservation. Secretary of State Herter, on behalf of
the Eisenhower administration, later criticized the Connally
Reservation: “‘As a world leader, we are setting an
exceedingly poor example by such [p]arochial action as the
Connally Amendment.’”67 Scholars continued to call for a
modification of the 1946 declaration and accept the
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ to avoid “denigrating” the
authority of the Court.68
In the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for the Fiscal
Year 1978,69 Congress requested the President to prepare a
report on the reform and restructuring of the United Nations
system.70 In the report, the President recognized that the
Connally Reservation “conflicts with the provisions of the
Court’s Statute71 that the Court shall determine what matters
are within its jurisdiction….”72 The report recommended
reinvesting exclusive jurisdiction in the ICJ in order to
strengthen the use of the ICJ to settle international disputes.73

66

U.S. Declaration of Aug. 14, 1946, 61 Stat. 1218 (1947), reprinted
in MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL: STATUS AS ATT 31 DECEMBER 1982, at
23-24, UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/2 (1983).
67
Close Vote, TIME MAG. (Sept. 12, 1960) available at
http://205.188.238.109/time/magazine/printout/0,8816,897512,00.html
(last visited April 27, 2007).
68
Anthony D’Amato, Modifying U.S. Acceptance of the Compulsory
Jurisdiction of the World Court, 79 AM. J. INT’L. L. 385, 401-02 (1985).
69
Foreign Relations Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 1978,
Pub.L.No. 95-105, 91 Stat. 844 (1977).
70
Reform and Restructuring of the U.N. System, Department of State
Publication 8940 (June 1978) at 5.
71
Court’s Statute, supra note 15, at Art. 3, para.1.
72
Reform and Restructuring of the U.N. System, supra note 70, at 17.
73
Between 1946 and 1978, the United States had committed itself
without reservation to the jurisdiction of the ICJ of the Court in 34
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President Carter observed that the Connally Reservation was
an obstacle to maximizing utilization of the ICJ because “it
has caused other States to question U.S. confidence in the
Court, and it (or its equivalent) in other states has been used
as a means to defeat the Court’s consideration of legal issues
which are clearly international in character.”74 “The
Department of State [likewise affirmed that the Connally]
Reservation d[id] not provide the U.S. with any substantial
benefit, and every Administration since that of President
Eisenhower [until the date of the report] urged its repeal.”75
To this day, however, the Connally Reservation retains
vitality.76 While the Connally Reservation was not formally
invoked in any of the cases recently decided by the ICJ, the
President’s decision to instead completely withdraw from the
Protocol 77 undermines the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ
in every future case, exceeding the more circumscribed and
already politically disfavored escape route contemplated by
the Connally Reservation.
multilateral treaties and 21 bilateral agreements with respect to disputes
arising under them. Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 17-18.
76
The Interhandel Case (Swit. v. U.S.), 1959 I.C.J. No. 6 (Mar. 21),
is the only case in which the United States formally exercised the
Connally Reservation. In that case, Switzerland filed a claim demanding
the return of certain seized property of the Interhandel corporation.
Switzerland rejected the application of the reservation finding that a
disagreement by the parties as to the interpretation of the subject treaty
was a question of international law and went directly to the merits of the
case. Because the case was already pending in the United States court, the
ICJ did not have occasion to rule on the validity of the automatic
reservation clause.
Interestingly, Bulgaria invoked the Connally
Reservation on the basis of reciprocity against the United States in Aerial
Incident of 27 July 1955 (U.S. v. Bulgaria, 1960 I.C.J. 146 (May 30).).
See Richard Falk, The Iran Hostage Crisis: Easy Answers and Hard
Questions, 74 AM. J. INT’L. L. 411(1980).
77
Article 1 of the Protocol provides: “Disputes arising out of the
interpretation or application of the [Vienna] Convention shall lie within
the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and may
accordingly be brought before the Court by a written application made by
any party to the dispute being a Party to the present Protocol.” Protocol,
supra note 48.
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AMERICA’S SUBMISSION TO ICJ JURISDICTION
IN ARTICLE 36 CASES: 1979
A. United States v Iran: The Legal Position of the
United States in 1979

The legal position taken by the United States before the
ICJ in the Iran hostage crisis in 1979 provides the very legal
basis for accepting ICJ legal precedent with respect to current
domestic cases raising treaty violations of Article 36.
Ironically, after Bulgaria invoked the reciprocal application
of the Connally Reservation against the United States in
1955, forcing America to withdraw its own claim,78 the Iran
hostage crisis marked the first time in the succeeding thirtyfive years that the United States turned to the ICJ for
remediation.79 This move was consistent with America’s
then foreign policy favoring investiture of exclusive
jurisdiction in the ICJ over international disputes.80
The 1979 case relates to the forced takeover of the
American Embassy in Tehran and the American Consulates
in Tabriz and Shiraz and the detention of 50 Americans by
militants.81 To satisfy its prima facie burden to establish the
jurisdiction of the ICJ, the United States primarily relied on
the identical provisions of the Protocol and Article 1 of the
Optional Protocols on the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes
attached to the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and
Consular Relations,82 which provide that: “Disputes arising
out of the interpretation or application of the Convention
shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the
78

Memorandum, supra note 17.
Leo Gross, The Case Concerning the United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran: Phase of Provisional Measures, 74 AM. J. INT’L
L. 395, 410 (1980).
80
See discussion supra Section II.
81
Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents [hereinafter
“ICJ Pleadings”]. Republished by The Hague, (1982). 1980 I.C.J. 3, No.
64 (May 24).
82
Gross, supra note 79, at 400.
79
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International Court of Justice…” Referring to the VCCR
and the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
(1961 Convention), the ICJ concluded that Article 1 provides
“in the clearest manner for the compulsory jurisdiction of the
court.”83
Then Legal Advisor and Agent to the United States,
Roberts B. Owen, citing Article 1 of the Protocol,
unequivocally stated the position of the United States with
regard to the legal principles of compulsory jurisdiction of
the ICJ: “Since both States [U.S. and Iran] are parties to the
Protocol, and since one of them (the United States) has
presented an application to the Court, Article 1 confers
mandatory jurisdiction upon the Court.”84 However, having
established the Court’s jurisdiction, it remained to show that
the 50 hostages concerned, by their status, were covered by
the VCCR and the 1961 Convention. The ICJ was satisfied
that 48 hostages were covered by the two conventions. That
left the status of two private individual hostages to be
resolved. The ICJ concluded that the Protocol also furnished
a basis for jurisdiction “with regard to the claims of the
United States in respect of the two individuals in question.”85
Thus, the ICJ assumed both subject matter jurisdiction over
an Article 36 claim as well as jurisdiction over the individual
hostages who, because of their status under the treaty, were
subject to treaty protection pursuant to the claim asserted by
the United States.
Indeed, the gravamen of America’s complaint before the
ICJ arising under the VCCR, was unambiguously argued by
Benjamin Civiletti, then Attorney General and U.S. counsel
before the ICJ: “The Convention on Consular Relations also
83

Order of the Court, December 15, 1979, para. 17, [1979] ICJ Rep.
7. reprinted in 74 AM. J. INT’L. L. 266 (1980). As a caveat, the Court also
acknowledged that Articles II and III provided alternative avenues for
settlement and conciliation, respectively, but that the right of unilateral
arraignment in Article I was in no way modified by Articles II and III.
This was completely consistent with the position taken by the U.S. during
the oral argument of Mr. Owen stating that recourse under Articles II and
III are purely optional. See ICJ Pleadings, supra note 81, para. 27.
84
ICJ Pleadings, supra note 81, para. 27.
85
Order of the Court, supra note 83, paras. 19 and 20, at 271-72.
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requires the receiving State [Iran] to permit another State’s
party’s consular officers to communicate with and have
access to their nationals. The right is manifestly violated
when the consular officers are themselves held
incommunicado by force.”86 In fact, a violation of Article 36
of the VCCR was specifically included as one of the claims
asserted against Iran and submitted to the ICJ under
principles of compulsory jurisdiction for adjudication and
remedial measures.87 There can be no question that the
United States expected Iran to comply with the ICJ’s
adjudication of the Article 36 treaty violation with respect to
American nationals being held as hostages and denied access
to their consular representatives.
Accordingly, the State Department’s later justification in
2005 for divesting the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ
under the Protocol, in response to the ICJ finding that
America was in “manifest violation” of Article 36 of the
VCCR, as a need to “[protect] against future International
Court of Justice judgments that might similarly interfere in
ways we did not anticipate when we joined the optional
protocol,”88 is purely disingenuous. The United States was
the first country to exercise what it described as the ICJ’s
compulsory jurisdiction to remedy an Article 36 violation
based on a manifest violation of the VCCR by Iran in
refusing consular access to a U.S. national. Not only could
the United States have anticipated the results in the ICJ
decisions in Sanchez-Llamas and Bustillo, the United States
urged the ICJ to adopt that same legal position in its own
application for relief in the Iran hostage crisis. The ICJ ruled
exactly in the recent Article 36 cases as the United States had
asked it to rule during the Iran hostage crisis.
Based on clear international precedent, the Supreme
Court should have found that such precedent compelled a
ruling in Sanchez-Llamas and Bustillo, as opposed to merely
assuming that an individual foreign national has the right to
86

Supra note 83, para. 23 (emphasis added).
Id. at 8, para. 5(a) Judgment Requested.
88
U.S. Says It Has Withdrawn From World Judicial Body, supra note
56 (emphasis added).
87
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raise a treaty violation by state authorities as part of his
defense. The assumption had the effect of putting off the
inevitable job of the Supreme Court, advocated by Justice
Breyer, to comprehensively define and explain the
relationship between domestic and international courts.89 At
best, the Court has created strange legal reasoning based on
some unexplained principle of assumption upon which due
process rights are not decided by the Court.
VI.

A CONFLICT OF LAWS: THE AFTERMATH OF THE
ICJ’S DECISIONS IN THE LAGRAND AND AVENA
CASES
A. LaGrand and Avena: A Remedy for the Right

The ICJ has repeatedly ruled on the legal obligations of
the United States under Article 36, in conformity with the
VCCR and the Protocol. The LaGrand case,90 involving a
suit by the Germany against the United States, stands for the
proposition that: the VCCR establishes rights for individuals
and not just member states;91 domestic procedural default
rules cannot be applied to nullify treaty rights;92 and it was
“incumbent” upon the United States93 to provide a remedy for
an Article 36 violation of its own choosing by means of a
legally obligatory review and reconsideration of all
convictions and sentences of affected individuals.
This was perhaps the first blow to continued participation
by the United States in the ICJ. The ICJ’s determination that
Article 36 created an individually enforceable right under
treaty was in sharp contrast with American courts that had
either not resolved the question or expressly rejected the
enforceability of Article 36 rights under the VCCR by

89

Hon. Stephen Breyer, supra note 12.
LaGrand Case (F.R.G. V. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27).
91
Id. at 494, para. 77.
92
Id. at 497, paras. 90-91.
93
Id. at 513-14, paras. 125-26. (The remedial provisions of the
decision were stated in mandatory and not advisory terms.)
90
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individual foreign nationals in domestic criminal
proceedings.94
It was then that the institutional conflict erupted between
the ICJ, the Supreme Court, and the Arizona Governor. In
the wake of the ICJ decision, the Supreme Court and the
Governor of Arizona refused to recognize the ICJ’s March 3,
1999 interim order staying LaGrand’s execution, while the
case was pending before the ICJ for final decision. The ICJ
then ruled that this refusal evidenced a Protocol violation by
the United States of its “international legal obligation to
comply” and “to take all measures at its disposal” to
effectuate the orders of the ICJ.95 The refusal was a rather
transparent foreign policy reaction, as opposed to a legal
response, to the decision. Indeed, the Governor’s refusal to
honor the ICJ interim order directly contradicted the Arizona
Clemency Board recommended stay of execution.96 At the
same time, the Supreme Court denied Germany’s separate
application to stay execution, although the option of granting
a preliminary stay was an option available to the Court.97
This conflict underscored the intransigence of the United
States where international treaty obligations were not suited
to domestic policy prerogatives. Given the Supreme Court’s
later refusal in Sanchez-Llamas and Bustillo to even
acknowledge the law of the case in LaGrand, precluding the
use of state procedural default rules to nullify treaty rights of
individuals is in direct conflict with international law.98 The
94

See United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2000); United
States v. Jiminez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 198-99 (5th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 394 (6th Cir. 2001); United States
v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 226 F.3d 616, 621-22 (7th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Santos, 253 F.3d 1105, 1108 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Lombera-Carmolinga, 206 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Minjares-Alvarez, 264 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Cordoba-Mosquera, 212 F.3d 1194, 1196 (11th Cir. 2000); Ledezma
v.State, 626 N.W.2d 134 (Iowa 2001); State v. Issa, 752 N.E.2d 904
(Ohio 2001); Kasi v.Commonwealth, 508 S.E.2d 57 (Va. 1998).
95
LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 508, paras. 115-16.
96
Id. at 507-08, para. 113.
97
Id. at 508, para. 114.
98
Although some may argue that rulings of the ICJ are case specific
based on the express language of the Protocol, there is some authority for
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LaGrand decision was reaffirmed by the ICJ in Avena which
followed.
B. Creating Binding International Policy
In Avena,99 the ICJ again found multiple violations of
Article 36 by the United States in fifty-one individual cases
brought by Mexico. As a result, the ICJ reaffirmed the
LaGrand decision100 and ordered the same remedial measures
including the review and reconsideration of all convictions
resulting in a lengthy period of incarceration of the subject
Mexican nationals.101 Then, in an astounding conclusion to
the opinion, the ICJ escalated the conflict. The ICJ
concluded, based on the earlier principles articulated in
LaGrand, its decision established binding legal precedent in
all future cases involving similarly situated foreign nationals
in domestic American proceedings:
The Court would now re-emphasize a point of
importance. In the present case, it has had
occasion to examine the obligations of the
United States under Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention…To avoid any ambiguity, it
should be made clear that…the Court has been
addressing the issues of principle raised in the
course of present proceedings from the
viewpoint of the general application of the
Vienna Convention, and there can be no
question of making an a contrario argument in
the proposition that when the ICJ interprets a multilateral treaty, its
decision addresses the objective meaning of the treaty which must be
applied in future cases as having precedential value. This finds support in
Article 63 of the ICJ Statute, which requires the ICJ to notify other treaty
adherents who are non-parties to the case before it when such
interpretations are issued to allow other members to intervene in the case
as a matter of right.
99
Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v.
U.S.), 2004 I.C.J.12, No. 128 (Mar. 31).
100
Id. at 44-5, paras. 111-14.
101
Id. at 51, para. 131.

24

Trends and Issues in Constitutional Law

Vol. 2

respect of any of the Court’s findings in the
present Judgment. In other words, the fact that
in this case the Court’s ruling has concerned
only Mexican nationals cannot be taken to
imply that the conclusions reached by it in the
present Judgment do not apply to other foreign
nationals finding themselves in similar
situations in the United States.102
C. The Resulting Conflict of Law
While much has been written about these two decisions,
nothing seemed to predict the Supreme Court’s next move in
the aftermath of these cases. Indeed, there has been almost no
mention about that aspect of the ICJ decision which
ostensibly binds domestic courts and state governments to the
interpretation and application of Article 36 by the ICJ in all
future cases. Clearly, the Supreme Court had no interest or
involvement in the development of international law under
the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. Subsequently, the
Supreme Court behaved in its own later decisions as if the
United States was a disinterested party. The thinking turned
out to be particularly short-sighted in view of America’s later
foreign policy decision to withdraw from the Protocol in
2005, resulting in Article 36 disputes being handed back to
the Supreme Court, but only after international legal
precedent had been firmly decided by the ICJ.
D. 2007 Update: Medellin Returns to the Supreme
Court
The legal mess continues to escalate. The Texas court
flatly refused to apply the ICJ decision in Avena to defendant
Medellin’s case on remand, despite the President’s
Memorandum of February 2005 obligating the United States
to do so. The Texas court concluded that it did not construe
the constitutional provisions as expressly or implicitly
102

Id. at 57, para. 151.
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granting the President the authority to mandate state court
compliance with the ICJ Avena decision. 103
Undoubtedly, Justice Breyer saw the proverbial
handwriting on the wall when he emphasized the critical need
to decide these issues with full consideration of the legal
relationships between the ICJ and American courts.104 It
remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will embrace
the task on the second visit of the Medellin case to its
chambers.105
VII.

VI. AMERICA’S RETREAT FROM THE
PROTOCOL: IS ICJ PRECEDENT BINDING?

A. The Political Dispute Dividing the U.S. and the
ICJ
The political controversy, that may explain the Supreme
Court’s issue avoidance behavior, arises out of a fundamental
disagreement between the executive branch of the United
States government and the ICJ about the right of individual
defendants, under international agreements, to assert
violations of treaty rights in American courts. On one hand,
the Government claims that there is a long-established
presumption that treaties and other international agreements
do not create individual judicially enforceable rights.106
Hence, a foreign national may not claim in an American court
that a state has convicted him in violation of treaty
provisions. Under these circumstances, the best that a
detained foreign national defendant can hope for is a nonjudicial remedy such as post-conviction clemency or
reparations. 107 In his dissent in Sanchez-Llamas, Justice
103

Ex Parte Medellin, No. AP-75207, 2006 W.L. 3302639 (Tex.
Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2007).
104
Hon. Stephen Breyer, supra note 12.
105
Ex Parte Medellin, petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3398
(January 16, 2007) (No. 06-984).
106
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Medellin v. Dretke,
O.T. 2004, No. 04-5928, at 11.
107
Id. at 7.
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Breyer rejected the government’s claim regarding any such
presumption, stating, “that no such presumption exists.” 108
In opposition, the ICJ has consistently rejected the United
States’ claim that treaty rights may only be enforced by
member states to the treaty, and not individuals.109 Consistent
with its interpretation that a specific treaty may provide an
individually enforceable right to raise a violation, the ICJ
acknowledged that any remedial measures must be left to the
domestic laws of the member states consistent with each
nation’s autonomy under international law.110 However, the
member state does have an affirmative obligation under the
Protocol to remediate treaty violations.111 Thus, the ICJ
firmly concluded that the Vienna Convention creates
judicially enforceable rights, with the concomitant obligation
of each member state to provide the appropriate judicial
remedy to vindicate the violation of the right.112
B. The Impact of Forum Selection Clauses on the
Binding Affect of International Law
Article 59 of the Court’s Statute 113 provides that a
decision of the ICJ has no binding force except between the
108

Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669, 2697 (2006) (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
109
Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v.
U.S.), 2004 I.C.J.128, paras. 121, 128 (Mar. 31); LaGrand Case (F.R.G.
V. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, para. 125 (June 27).
110
VCCR, supra note 2, at Art. 36(2), 21 U.S.T., at 101, (laws and
regulations “must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which
the rights accorded under this Article are intended.”).
111
Id.
112
The difficulty of achieving uniformity in remedial action among
the various member states is discussed at point D infra. See also Miriam
Miquelon-Weismann, The Convention on Cybercrime: A Harmonized
Implementation of International Penal Law: What Prospects for
Procedural Due Process? 23 J. MARSHALL. J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.329,
357 (2005). (“Whether a particular party has enacted sufficient due
process protections, or even extends existing domestic due process
protections to aliens prosecuted within its borders, must necessarily
remain untested until cases are actually prosecuted.”)
113
Court’s Statute, supra note 15.
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parties and in respect to that particular case.114 Thus, the
legal principle of stare decisis does not exist in the traditional
sense in international law.115 However, the Supreme Court
has continually recognized the utility and enforceability of
forum selection clauses under international law, such as the
Protocol, even assuming that “‘a contrary legal result would
be forthcoming in a domestic context.’”116 The policy
considerations of meeting international expectations of
predictability and uniformity as the basis to enforce a
voluntary agreement between the parties to submit to
international or foreign authority under a forum selection
clause was emphasized by the Court: “We cannot have trade
and commerce in world markets and international waters
exclusively on our own terms, governed by our laws, and
resolved in our courts.”117
In the context of the VCCR and the utility of the Protocol
as a forum selection clause, the Court observed that it should
“give respectful consideration to the interpretation of an
international treaty rendered by an international court with
jurisdiction to interpret such.”118 In early dicta in the Breard
decision, the Court assumed without deciding that the VCCR
“arguably confers on an individual the right to consular
assistance following arrest…”119 This language may be
something short of wholesale approval of ICJ interpretation
of Article 36 as binding legal precedent, however, there is
recognition that this interpretation cannot and should not be
ignored.
Apparently, the fact that the Supreme Court continually
assumes without deciding that Article 36 confers individually
114

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 103, cmt (b)

(1987).
115

Id.
See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985).
117
Bremen v. Zapatta Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972).
118
Greene v. Gilmore, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998).
119
Id. at 376. Greene’s claim under the VCCR based on an Article 36
violation was rejected on other procedural grounds. Parenthetically, the
ruling based upon an interpretation of a state’s procedural default rules
has also been subsequently rejected by the ICJ.
116
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enforceable rights upon foreign nationals in domestic
proceedings implies that the Court continues to apply the
standard of “respectful consideration” to ICJ decisions.
Arguably, the correct standard for the Court to apply is not
“respectful consideration” but actual recognition of the ICJ
order interpreting the treaty and establishing international
policy as being dispositive of the issue. This would be
consistent with the history of the negotiations leading up to
the codification of a forum selection clause under the
Protocol, the post-ratification conduct and legal position
espoused by the United States in cases before the ICJ relating
to Article 36 interpretation, and the prior decisions of the
Supreme Court120 enforcing forum selection clauses entered
into voluntarily by the parties.
C. ICJ Decisions Should Be Treated as Binding
Interpretation of Article 36 Based on the
Negotiated Agreement Between Sovereigns
The Supreme Court has stated repeatedly that a treaty
ratified by the United States is the law of the land.121
representing an agreement among sovereign powers.122 As
such, the Court has considered as aids to treaty interpretation
the negotiating and drafting history and the post-ratification
understanding of the parties.123
The negotiating and drafting history demonstrates that the
United States played a major role in negotiating the specific
language of the VCCR and the Protocol.124 The United
States’ fully supported the Protocol, with the understanding
that members would be free to accept or reject the Protocol.
However, once accepted, members were bound by its

120

Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 629; Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2
122
Zicherman v. Korean Airlines Co., Ltd., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996).
123
Id.
124
Report of the United States Delegation to the Vienna Conference
on Consular Relations, reprinted in Sen. Exec. E., 91st Cong., 1st Sess.,
May 8, 1969 at 41, 59-61.
121
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operation,125 including Article 1126 of the Protocol which
places the adjudication of treaty interpretation squarely
within the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. The United
States voluntarily accepted the Protocol when it ratified the
VCCR in 1969 127 and has continued in the post-ratification
period to be bound voluntarily by its operation until 2005,
when the United States withdrew.128
Moreover, the United States argued before the ICJ during
the Iran hostage crisis that the failure to provide consular
access under Article 36 is a manifest violation of the treaty.129
The ICJ agreed and has repeatedly issued decisions consistent
with that interpretation of the VCCR. There is no legal
authority to suggest that a foreign policy decision by the
executive branch to withdraw from the compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ somehow voids international legal
principles and an entire line of cases decided by the ICJ while
the United States voluntarily submitted itself to the
jurisdiction of that Court and urged the Court to embrace
those same legal principles.
While the Supreme Court did not explicitly enforce ICJ
interpretation of Article 36 in Sanchez-Llamas and Bustillo, it
must assume (without deciding) that it is the law. The Court
is at a loss of both words and logic to find otherwise.
D. Binding State Courts to ICJ Precedent PostProtocol
It is axiomatic that the constitution of the United States130
declares a treaty to be the supreme law of the land and its
obligations are binding on the courts of the United States.131
125
126

Id. at 72-73.
Protocol, supra note 48. See also supra text accompanying note

77.
127

Charter of the United Nations, supra note 3.
Court’s Statute, supra note 15; see also supra note 16.
129
Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran, supra note 81.
130
U.S. CONST. art VI, cl.2.
131
United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 109-10
(1801).
128
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The VCCR is a self-executing treaty requiring no domestic
legislation to make it operative.132 Self-executing treaties
have the force and effect of a legislative enactment.133 The
Supreme Court early recognized that the Constitution places
self-executing treaties in the same category as other laws of
Congress that create rights “capable of enforcement as
between private parties.”134
Both James Madison135 and John Jay136 emphasized the
importance of federal supremacy over state and local
governments in foreign affairs. Likewise, the Supreme
Court, early recognized federal supremacy in the field of
foreign affairs: “Plainly, the external powers of the United
States are to be exercised without regard to state laws or
policies. The supremacy of a treaty in this respect has been
recognized from the beginning.”137 So, what happens to the
rules governing federal supremacy after the United States
withdraws from a Protocol?
The question now certain to be presented to the Supreme
Court on a petition for writ of certiorari, arising out of the
recent decision by the state of Texas,138 is whether the
President of the United States can bind state courts postprotocol to follow ICJ precedent by virtue of a presidential
memorandum submitted to the ICJ committing the states to
do so. The Texas court seemed to think that presidential
memoranda were not included in the group of documents,
such as treaties and protocols, categorically included under
132

S. Exec. Rep. No.91-9 app. at 5 (1969) (statement of Deputy Legal
Advisor J. Edward Lyerly). See, e.g., Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.2d 615,622
(4th Cir. 1988).
133
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
134
The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884).
135
THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 264 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961). The power to make treaties and regulate commerce
with foreign powers was seen as an “obvious and essential branch of
federal administration.” Id.
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 43 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
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United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937).
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Ex Parte Medellin, petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3398
(January 16, 2007) (No. 06-984).
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the federal supremacy clause and other case precedent
declaring federal superiority in the field.139 In other words,
the Texas court found that the withdrawal from the Protocol
left the President without the power to bind the states to ICJ
orders. It is probably fair to say that neither the President in
issuing the 2005 Memorandum nor the Supreme Court
anticipated this legal result as a consequence of withdrawing
from the Protocol.
While this issue may provide future scholars with fertile
ground for comment, the short answer to a relatively lengthy
opinion may be that the Texas court simply overlooked the
meaning of the word “treaty.”
The Supreme Court observed long ago:
[N]egotiations, acceptance of the assignment
and agreements and understandings in
respect thereof were within the competence of
the President may not be doubted…
an
international compact, as this was, is not
always a treaty which requires the
participation of the Senate. There are many
such compacts, of which a protocol, a modus
vivendi, a postal convention and [commercial]
agreements like that under consideration
are illustrations… [the commercial agreement]
was a compact negotiated and proclaimed
under the authority of the President, and as
such was a ‘treaty’…140
Presumably, the commitment made by the President to
the ICJ pursuant to presidential memorandum fits into the
seemingly broad penumbra of illustrations defining the
meaning of “treaty.”141
139

Id.
Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330-31.
141
Parenthetically, a good deal more can be said about the Texas
case. For example, the case completely ignores legal considerations
attendant to international decisions rendered under compulsory forum
selection clauses like the one in the Protocol.
140
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In any case, as a direct result of the decision to withdraw
from the Protocol, state courts have refused to follow ICJ
orders regarding the impact of an Article 36 violation on the
criminal conviction of a foreign national. The Supreme Court
should not assume without deciding that such a right exists.
The treatment of foreign nationals in American courts should
not turn on an argument over the authority of the President to
make the states comply with international law. In a country
that prides itself on the principle of legality, where the law as
opposed to personal predilection governs the outcome of a
case, mere assumptions of the Supreme Court about the due
process rights of foreign nationals fall short.142
VIII. THE PROBLEMS INHERENT
ENFORCEABLE LEGAL RIGHTS

IN

VINDICATING

Based upon the Supreme Court’s refusal in SanchezLlamas to apply the exclusionary rule to protect the rights of
foreign nationals, where the violation of those rights is
conceded, or to prevent state procedural default rules from
barring remediation, the issue of extending existing domestic
due process protections to foreign nationals prosecuted within
America’s borders remains unclear. The Supreme Court
should finally decide the application of international law to
domestic legal proceedings.
The need for this final
determination is critical because of the general nature of
international treaty enforcement mechanisms. Under most
treaties, the dynamic of self-enforcement of the treaty
objectives remains within the domain of each respective
national legislature. That is particularly the case under the
142

One aspect of the principle of legality is the notion that the courts
may not engage in the “arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the
penal law and [the] resort to legal formalism as a constraint against
unbridled discretion.” John Jeffries, Legality, Vagueness, and the
Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 201 (1985). The
ambivalence shown by the Supreme Court with regard to the orders of the
ICJ and the refusal to articulate any legal standard against which to
provide foreign nationals notice of their rights in American courts is the
precise kind of arbitrary judicial rule-making sought to be precluded by
the principle of legality.
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VCCR. ICJ orders require remediation in conformity with
international obligations pursuant to the VCCR but permit
each member state to fashion remedial measures according to
each member’s own legislative and judicial preferences.
Also central to the model of procedural due process in the
international sphere is the mandate that all nations recognize:
[R]ights arising pursuant to obligations it has
undertaken under the 1950 Council of Europe
Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [ECHR],
the 1966 United Nations International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and
other applicable international human rights
instruments, and which shall incorporate the
principle of proportionality.143
However, Supreme Court decisions have historically
treated these mandates with plain indifference. For example,
in rejecting an alien’s claim for damages under the Aliens
Tort Statute arising out of an alleged arbitrary arrest and
unlawful seizure,144 the Supreme Court concluded that neither
the ECHR nor the other international treaties imposed any
legal obligation on the United States. Therefore, federal
courts had no power to enforce individual rights violations
143

Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, at Art. 15, para. 1.
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/185.htm, (last visited
May 29, 2007).
144
The petitioner was acquitted on charges arising out of the torture
and murder of a DEA agent by Mexican nationals. The Ninth Circuit
found, in a related lower court decision, Alvarez-Machain v. United
States, 331 F.3d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 2003)., that DEA agents had no
authority under federal law to execute an extra-territorial arrest of the
petitioner indicted in a federal court in Los Angeles. In fact, the agents
unlawfully kidnapped petitioner to bring him to the United States to stand
trial. Petitioner moved to dismiss his indictment based upon “outrageous
government conduct” and a violation of the extradition treaty with
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Supreme Court reversed holding that the forcible seizure did not divest
the federal court of jurisdiction. United States v. Alavrez, 504 U.S. 655
(1992).
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under these treaties, even where the United States was a
signatory.
The Court observed:
[Petitioner] says that his abduction by [DEA
operatives] was an ‘arbitrary arrest’ within the
meaning of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (Declaration), G.A. Res.
217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). And he
traces the rule against arbitrary arrest not only
to the Declaration, but also to article nine of
the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (Covenant), Dec. 19, 1996,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, to which the United States
is a party, and to various other conventions to
which it is not. But the Declaration does not
of its own force impose obligations as a matter
of international law […] [a]nd, although the
Covenant does not bind the United States as a
matter of international law, the United States
ratified the Covenant on the express
understanding that it was not self-executing
and so did not itself create obligations
enforceable in the federal courts.145
Thus, the ECHR, along with the other human rights
treaties, apparently creates no enforceable procedural due
process rights in United States federal courts.
Moreover, the decision to extend the protections of the
Bill of Rights to aliens is not an automatic one or implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty. Specifically, the Supreme
Court declined to extend the protection of the Fourth
Amendment to an alien extradited to the United States for
trial on criminal charges. The Court reasoned that “...aliens
receive constitutional protections when they have come
within the territory of the United States and developed
substantial connections with this country...but this sort of
145

Sosa v. Alavrez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 2767 (2004).
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presence-lawful but involuntary [extradition]- is not the sort
to indicate any substantial connection with our country.”146
Further rejecting the alien’s equal protection argument, to
wit: that aliens should be afforded the same constitutional
rights afforded U.S. citizens in criminal cases, the Court
concluded: “They are constitutional decisions of this Court
expressly according different protections to aliens than to
citizens, based on our conclusion that the particular
provisions in question were not intended to extend to aliens in
the same degree as to citizens.”147 Justice Kennedy, in his
concurring opinion, concludes that: “The distinction between
citizens and aliens follows from the undoubted proposition
that the Constitution does not create, nor do general
principles of law create, any judicial relation between our
country and some undefined, limitless class of non-citizens
who are beyond our territory.”148
These decisions leave little doubt that the Bill of Rights
does not operate extraterritorially in relation to searches and
seizures or in relation to constitutional infringements of the
right to privacy. The proposed application of these rights to
remediate Article 36 violations seems equally unlikely.
Instead, the Court extends existing procedural due process
guarantees to aliens on the two-prong voluntariness and
substantial connection analysis. That ad hoc determination
leaves little room for predictability in the application of the
treaty in the United States.
Accordingly, the procedural due process rhetoric of the
ICJ warning against the application of state procedural
default rules as a bar to remediation of treaty violations had
no demonstrable influence on American jurisprudence as
evidenced by the decision in Sanchez-Llamas and Bustillo.
The Supreme Court’s adherence to depriving foreign
nationals of procedural due process in these decisions,
reaffirming the principles of Breard, flies in the face of the
Golden Rule of foreign relations. Indeed, the United States
146
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should expect no more protection with respect to its citizens
similarly situated in other nations. In view of decision to
withdraw completely from the treaty, American citizens will
have no ability to rely on the protections of Article 36 once in
custody in another country. The cycle of international
mistrust is inevitably self-perpetuating under these
circumstances. Thus, even recognition of a judicially
enforceable treaty right may be only a pyrrhic victory. What
is an enforceable right without a remedy?
IX.

NATIONAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

The United States State Department recognizes the
importance of consular access to American citizens arrested
abroad. The Department’s Foreign Affairs Manual provides,
“[O]ur most important function as consular officers is to
protect and assist private U.S. citizens or nationals traveling
or residing abroad. Few of our citizens need that assistance
more than those who have been arrested in a foreign country
or imprisoned in a foreign jail.”149 The Department’s Foreign
Affairs Manual describes the VCCR as “ the most important
legislative and administrative authorities for providing
assistance to U.S. citizens or nationals who are detained,
arrested or imprisoned abroad….”150 The importance of
maximizing human rights, due process, and quick consular
access, is a clearly stated foreign policy goal. Yet, there is a
real disconnect in the Supreme Court between upholding
America’s obligations under treaty and the foreign policy
goal of obtaining fair treatment for U.S. citizens under the
same legal document. The maxim “do unto others as you
would have them do unto you”151 has become enormously
problematic. Remarkably, the Foreign Relations Manual
includes an entire section about how U.S. consular officers
should respond to the complaints of other host governments
149

7 Foreign Assistance Manual (FAM) §412 Policy, at 1 (Sept. 1,
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April 24, 2007).
150
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that America does not honor its obligations under Article 36:
“Even where this might be true, it does not exempt the host
government from its treaty obligations. Two wrongs do not
make a right.”152
While an almost laughable retort, the notion that
America’s own misbehavior should not excuse the behavior
of other member states, demonstrates the same disregard for
America’s obligations under the VCCR as that exhibited by
the executive and judicial branches of government.
Reciprocal treaty violations which cannot be remedied by the
extension of basic procedural due process rights to detained
foreign nationals only serves to underscore the confusion
embedded in America’s foreign policy contributed to by the
Court’s decisions.
Justice Breyer observed in his dissent in Sanchez-Llamas
that the United States joined the VCCR in order to promote
the orderly and effective conduct of consular relations
between member states and to guarantee protection to
American citizens abroad.153 The difficulty in achieving these
goals poses a difficult question where enforcement depends
upon “the details of a nation’s legal system”154 because
treaties do not include enforcement details which are left to
member state preferences. “Yet, without any such guarantees
it may prove difficult to prevent an individual nation, through
application of its system’s details, from denying in practice
the rights that the treaty sought to assure.”155
X.

CONCLUSION: THE GOLDEN RULE

The current state of the law has fomented a quagmire of
legal and political turf battles over the authority to interpret
and apply international law in domestic criminal proceedings.
The aspirational goal of providing even legal footing for all
foreign nationals, including our own citizens, is the most
152
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153
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salient feature of the VCCR. Yet, the Court remains
indifferent to the inevitable need to establish working
international relations shored up by domestic legal systems.
Justice Breyer warns that a system which denies procedural
due process to foreign nationals is one that:
…leaves States free to deny effective relief for
Convention violations, despite America’s
promise to provide just such relief. That
approach risks weakening respect abroad for
the right of foreign nationals… And it
increases the difficulties faced by the United
States and other nations who would, through
binding treaties, strengthen the role that law
can play in assuring all citizens, including
American citizens, fair treatment throughout
the world.156
America’s foreign policy goals cannot be limited to
spreading democracy abroad. Instead, the goal should be to
enliven the principles of human rights for all citizens of the
world even when those foreign nationals seek protections in
this home.
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Id. at 2709.

